Recently I finished reading an uncommonly enlightening book, a memoir of sorts which balances an insider's personal experiences with a detailed but wide-ranging account of the Algerian civil war. The one caveat is that it is in French, and as far as I can tell, has not been translated into English (or at least, there doesn't seem to be an English version available for free online - the original can be found on the Internet Archive).
The book is called "Contre-Espionnage Algérien - Notre Guerre Contre Les Islamistes" and was written by Abdelkader Tigha, a former Algerian secret-serviceman, and war reporter Philippe Lobjois. It tells the story of Tigha's time in the Algerian secret service, as well as his subsequent escape from the country, all garnished with explanations of the historical and political background of the late-eighties-to-mid-two-thousands.
This informative page-turner discusses juicy details of Algeria's recent past, like how Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the recently deposed president, came to power - apparently his secret recipe included playing on voters' nostalgia for Boumediene, promising the electorate liberation from the rule of the military, and voter fraud. The corresponding chapter details how foreign observers surveyed the elections only in certain cities, while in rural areas, armed pro-regime forces maintained a presence at the urns to clarify to voters whom they should elect.
Tigha relates countless anecdotes which come together in a partial reconstruction of a unique experience of a murderous conflict. One gains a certain insight from this book which the average study of the general progression of the war could not give. Of particular note in this regard are the places where the authors describe the prevailing moods within the secret service during the war.
Like only an insider could, he portrays the heavy contempt which many in his service had for that part of the population which tacitly supported the population. At one point, he recounts how colonel Djebbar M'Henna exclaimed that the inhabitants of Rais, a stronghold of the terrorists where those same terrorists had just carried out a massacre, could "go f*** themselves" (on the other hand, the gendarmes did visit the site of the massacre and arm the population to prepare them for future attacks).
Some of the revelations in this work are of immense significance. Tigha is one of the main sources cited on the Wikipedia article on the "Organisation of Young Free Algerians", which he claims was a facade which the DRS (Algerian secret service) used to murder terrorists and suspected terrorists.
In this telling, the morality of certain actions undertaken by the Algerian state apparatus often ends up being grey rather than black or white, as torturers attempt to justify torturing terrorists in order to find other terrorists. Based on Tigha's account, one person especially seems to exemplify this kind of moral ambivalence, namely Major General Smain Lamari. On one hand, he came up with the winning strategy to strike a pact with the more moderate Islamist group, the AIS*, against the GIA, thus securing the government's victory in the war and the restoration of peace. On the other, he ordered the illegal execution of prisoners which led to the creation of the OJAL, and participated in a concerted effort to return Tigha to Algeria after he had fled the country. The author even cites a rumour that, at a generals' meeting in Châteauneuf, Lamari had said he was willing to eliminate up to three million Algerians if that was what was needed to defeat the terrorists.
In short, this is an compelling and educational book which I can only recommend. Have a good day.
*Islamic Salvation Army in English; see https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Salvation_Front
The book is called "Contre-Espionnage Algérien - Notre Guerre Contre Les Islamistes" and was written by Abdelkader Tigha, a former Algerian secret-serviceman, and war reporter Philippe Lobjois. It tells the story of Tigha's time in the Algerian secret service, as well as his subsequent escape from the country, all garnished with explanations of the historical and political background of the late-eighties-to-mid-two-thousands.
The book's cover.
This informative page-turner discusses juicy details of Algeria's recent past, like how Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the recently deposed president, came to power - apparently his secret recipe included playing on voters' nostalgia for Boumediene, promising the electorate liberation from the rule of the military, and voter fraud. The corresponding chapter details how foreign observers surveyed the elections only in certain cities, while in rural areas, armed pro-regime forces maintained a presence at the urns to clarify to voters whom they should elect.
Tigha relates countless anecdotes which come together in a partial reconstruction of a unique experience of a murderous conflict. One gains a certain insight from this book which the average study of the general progression of the war could not give. Of particular note in this regard are the places where the authors describe the prevailing moods within the secret service during the war.
Like only an insider could, he portrays the heavy contempt which many in his service had for that part of the population which tacitly supported the population. At one point, he recounts how colonel Djebbar M'Henna exclaimed that the inhabitants of Rais, a stronghold of the terrorists where those same terrorists had just carried out a massacre, could "go f*** themselves" (on the other hand, the gendarmes did visit the site of the massacre and arm the population to prepare them for future attacks).
Some of the revelations in this work are of immense significance. Tigha is one of the main sources cited on the Wikipedia article on the "Organisation of Young Free Algerians", which he claims was a facade which the DRS (Algerian secret service) used to murder terrorists and suspected terrorists.
In this telling, the morality of certain actions undertaken by the Algerian state apparatus often ends up being grey rather than black or white, as torturers attempt to justify torturing terrorists in order to find other terrorists. Based on Tigha's account, one person especially seems to exemplify this kind of moral ambivalence, namely Major General Smain Lamari. On one hand, he came up with the winning strategy to strike a pact with the more moderate Islamist group, the AIS*, against the GIA, thus securing the government's victory in the war and the restoration of peace. On the other, he ordered the illegal execution of prisoners which led to the creation of the OJAL, and participated in a concerted effort to return Tigha to Algeria after he had fled the country. The author even cites a rumour that, at a generals' meeting in Châteauneuf, Lamari had said he was willing to eliminate up to three million Algerians if that was what was needed to defeat the terrorists.
In short, this is an compelling and educational book which I can only recommend. Have a good day.
*Islamic Salvation Army in English; see https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Salvation_Front
Comments
Post a Comment